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We investigate the impact of charity tie-ins on transaction probabilities and sale prices using a large
database of eBay auctions.  We examine “natural experiments” of precisely matched clusters of charity
and non-charity auctions with identical titles, subtitles, sellers, and start prices.  We find a 6 to 14 percentage
point increase in sale probability and a 2 to 6 percent greater maximum bid for charity items, depending
on the fraction of auction proceeds that is donated to charity.  The impact on sale probability and price
is most pronounced among sellers without extensive eBay histories, suggesting that consumers view
charity as a signal of seller quality and a substitute for reputation.  We also find that charity-tied products
by all sellers are more likely to sell (and at higher prices) immediately following Hurricane Katrina,
implying that consumers derive direct utility from seller charity at times when charity is particularly
salient.
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1.  Introduction 
Many for-profit corporations contribute to public goods via charitable donations.
1  
There are several views on what motivates these contributions, which seem to conflict, at 
least superficially, with profit motives.    First, some group relevant to the firm – employees, 
consumers, or regulators – may value “charity for charity’s sake.”
2  As a result these 
constituencies may, respectively, take lower wages, pay higher prices, or pass supportive 
legislation for generous companies.
3  In this view, a firm’s charitable giving could result 
in higher profits.  A second view argues that support of public goods may result from 
owner or managerial preferences unrelated to profit maximization, potentially involving 
misgovernance as famously argued by Milton Friedman (1970).  A third, intermediate 
position holds that – particularly in cases of asymmetric information or where there exists 
the potential for opportunistic behavior – firms may use charity as a credible signal of 
quality or reliability (Fisman, Heal, and Nair, 2006).  This signaling view requires that 
less opportunistic managers also be those who derive greater utility from charitable giving 
or other contributions to public goods.  Consumers, in turn, then interpret charitable 
giving as a signal of the firm or manager’s trustworthiness or quality. 
In this paper, we assess the evidence on how consumers respond to charitable 
                                                        
1  See, for example, McKinsey (2008). 
2 We use this expression to refer to charity entering a person’s utility function.  There are several reasons 
why this might occur.    Individuals may value the well-being of others (altruism) or they may derive pleasure 
from the act of giving, what Andreoni (1989) termed warm glow.  Our paper does not distinguish among 
these explanations, but rather attempts to distinguish between the direct utility of charity and reputational 
benefits. 
3  A growing theoretical literature, exemplified by Bagnoli and Watts (2003) and Baron (2007, 2009), seeks to 
explain the adoption by firms of socially responsible practices when various decision-makers value the 
charitable output of these practices. 
 giving by firms—both “charity for charity’s sake” and signaling—by looking at sellers’ 
outcomes in charity and non-charity auctions on eBay.    The charity auctions we study are 
made through eBay’s Giving Works (GW) program, which allows sellers to direct a 
fraction of an auction’s proceeds (between 10 and 100 percent) to a charity of their choice.   
We utilize a new dataset that provides information – quarter by quarter – on the universe of 
items placed on eBay by any seller who initiates at least one GW auction in that quarter.
   
For our sample period of January 2005 to March 2008, we observe a total of 23.5 million 
auctions across 78,000 distinct sellers.    This includes a wide range of activities, including 
benefit auctions by non-profit sellers, for-profit sellers using eBay for occasional 
philanthropy, for-profit sellers that regularly make small donations (perhaps as part of a 
marketing strategy), and sellers that appear to experiment deliberately with the GW option.   
In many cases listings with identical titles, subtitles, start prices, and other auction 
attributes were listed by the same seller, often only a few days apart.    The only observable 
difference, both to us and also to potential bidders, was the listing’s charity component.  
We argue that this effectively presents a dataset of many thousands of natural experiments 
performed by eBay sellers that allows us to infer the value placed on charitable giving by 
consumers. 
Using a sample of over 150,000 auctions matched by seller, title, subtitle, and start 
price (extracted from our original sample of over 23 million auctions) we find a modest 
premium associated with GW auctions.    This ranges from a 6 percentage point higher sale 
probability and 2 percent higher sale price (conditional on selling) for auctions where 10 
percent of the proceeds went to charity, to increases in sale probability and price of 13 
1 percentage points and 6 percent, respectively, for 100 percent charity auctions.  This 
empirical result is robust to a broad range of additional controls and to matching based on 
an even more refined set of listing attributes. 
We further attempt to distinguish whether the GW premium is due primarily to 
consumers valuing “charity for charity’s sake” or their inferring a quality signal from the 
charity commitment.  In deciding whether to bid on a product, an eBay consumer must 
consider whether the item and its delivery will match the seller’s descriptions.  When 
consumers anticipate that some sellers will fail to provide satisfactory service, trade can 
slow or break down, as in Akerlof (1970).    This challenge is exacerbated by problems the 
online marketplace has had with seller misrepresentation over the years.
4  One obvious 
indicator of a seller’s expected quality or reliability is consistently positive feedback, which 
has been shown to have a significant impact on auction outcomes (see Houser and Wooders, 
2006; Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010).    We argue that a charity tie-in may serve as a substitute 
for a history of positive feedback in the minds of consumers, thereby benefitting 
inexperienced sellers.
5 
The intuition for charitable giving as a credible quality signal is straightforward and 
premised on the assumption that there are some sellers who care only about profits and 
others who care about profits as well as their impact on others.  Fisman et al. (2006) 
provide a formal model of sellers who separate by charitable giving.  For purely 
profit-minded sellers, charity is more “expensive” since they do not derive psychic benefits 
                                                        
4  For example, an audit conducted by Tiffany found that 73 percent of its silver jewelry listed on eBay were 
counterfeits (See “Tiffany and eBay in Fight over Fakes,” New York Times November 27, 2007).  See also 
Jin and Kato (2006), who find that baseball card quality is frequently misrepresented on eBay. 
5 There are obviously other means of influencing consumers’ quality inferences.  Roberts (2009), for 
example, presents evidence that warranties can be an effective substitute for seller reputation. 
2 from charitable giving.  Other sellers, however, receive utility from donating to charity 
and also suffer a psychic penalty when they act opportunistically with respect to consumers, 
for example by providing a lower quality product than advertised.  Under these 
assumptions, charitable tie-ins can act as a credible signal of product quality.
6 
If consumers believe that charity tie-ins are a useful indicator of seller reliability, 
we argue that the signal value should be greater for sellers whose quality is most uncertain.   
On eBay, these are the sellers who lack a long history of positive customer feedback.    We 
find that the sale probability and price premiums associated with GW auctions are 
concentrated among low-feedback sellers, in particular those in the lowest quartile of 
feedback within our sample.    For this subset of sellers, GW auctions are associated with a 
12 percentage point higher sale probability for 10 percent charity auctions, and as much as 
a 54 percentage point increase in sale probability for 100 percent auctions.  Additionally, 
for low-feedback sellers GW auctions have 4 percent to 25 percent higher sale prices for 10 
and 100 percent charity auctions, respectively.    For sellers in the highest feedback quartile 
the impact of GW is small.  We find that this relationship between GW impact and seller 
feedback is robust to a range of alternative specifications.  Consumers may have limited 
responses to charity by high-feedback sellers because GW status does not add significant 
information about these sellers’ quality.  By contrast, at low feedback levels much less 
seller-specific information is available, so consumers see GW status as a powerful signal 
about seller type. 
                                                        
6  Prior research has in fact found a correlation between measures of corporate citizenship and consumer trust 
(see, for example, Pivato et al., (2008)) but these correlations have problems of causality.  Similarly, Siegel 
and Vitaliano (2007) assume that socially responsible activity makes consumers more likely to find a firm 
trustworthy, and find that firms selling experience goods are more likely to invest in socially responsible 
practices than those selling search goods. 
3 The magnitudes of our results suggest that 10 percent GW auctions do not yield 
benefits that compensate for the revenue that goes to the charity.
7  Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations using our point estimates for increases in sale probability and final sale price 
indicate that low-feedback sellers exclusively using 10 percent GW auctions receive, in 
expectation, 96% of the present value of net revenue (accounting for listing fees and 
donations) that they would have received had they auctioned their products outside the GW 
program.    Thus, even for low feedback sellers the incremental returns are below the level 
required to offset the cost of donations.
8  Therefore choosing to donate can plausibly 
separate purely profit-maximizing sellers from those with other-regarding social 
preferences.  While our results suggest that opportunistic sellers will not, on average, 
increase profit by using GW, in this paper we are agnostic about sellers’ motivations for 
making charitable donations, including those we observe as “experiments.” During the 
period we investigate, the Giving Works program was relatively new, and reliable estimates 
of the program’s benefits were difficult to obtain by sellers.   
Finally, in an extension, we examine whether variation in perceived charity need 
affects consumers’ willingness to pay for charity-linked auctions.  We look at the holiday 
buying season (post-Thanksgiving to New Year’s), and also the period following Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, which triggered a surge in charitable giving nationwide (Center on 
Philanthropy at University of Indiana, 2006).  We find that the average GW premium 
increases for all donation levels in the months following Katrina.  Further, the GW 
                                                        
7  We also confirm that this is the case for higher donation levels. 
8  These same calculations show, however, that GivingWorks is an efficient way for sellers to pursue existing 
altruistic goals. 
4 premium rises by a comparable amount for all levels of seller feedback, suggesting that in 
periods of heightened awareness of charity, altruistic and/or warm glow motives may be 
more prevalent.  By contrast, we do not find any differential effect of the holiday period 
on the GW premium.
9 
There exists some prior research on the impact of charity, and corporate good works 
more broadly, on consumers’ willingness to pay.  Closest to our work is Elfenbein and 
McManus (2010), who examine the price premium associated with Giving Works sales on 
eBay using a hand-matched dataset of identical items sold in GW and non-GW auctions.  
They find evidence of a positive price premium that increases with the fraction of proceeds 
donated to charity and declines with the value of the underlying item for sale.    The current 
paper improves upon that work in several ways.    First, we are able to analyze the universe 
of GW auctions rather than a hand-drawn extract, which enables us to look across a broader 
range of products and to examine naturally occurring seller experiments in the marketplace.   
This, in turn, allows us to control for unobserved seller heterogeneity, the effects of which 
could not be ruled out in the prior work.    Second, since eBay has provided us with all GW 
listings and not just completed sales, we are able to examine the impact of GW on both 
price and sale probability, whereas Elfenbein and McManus (2010) are only able to look at 
the price differences, conditional on the product being sold.    Third, and most importantly, 
the richness of our data allow us to examine differing theories on the source of seller 
benefits from charity tie-ins. 
Most other work examining the benefits of firms’ good deeds has relied on 
                                                        
9 Note that this is consistent with the patterns reported by Levitt (2006) in his study of non-payment for 
bagels during Christmas, which he attributes to the economic stresses of this period. 
5 firm-level, cross-sectional studies, for example observing that companies with strong 
corporate citizenship earn higher profits, but these analyses are fraught with problems of 
causation (see Margolis and Walsh (2003) and Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007) for 
reviews of this literature).  Exceptions include Hiscox and Smyth’s (2008) experimental 
evaluation of how “fair labor” sourcing affects demand, and Casadesus-Masanell et al.’s 
(2009) study on Patagonia’s introduction of organic cotton to its clothing products.    These 
studies find a strong effect of corporate good works on willingness to pay.    In neither case, 
however, can the authors distinguish amongst the possible reasons for the effect, and 
potentially conflate the separate effects of corporate citizenship and marketing.     
More broadly, our work also builds on prior research that examines the relationship 
among altruism, reputation, and quality.    List (2006), for example, finds that baseball card 
sellers exhibit non-selfish behavior in market transactions only when long-term commercial 
relationships are possible, despite the fact that sellers with and without potential future 
business behave altruistically in lab experiments.  McManus and Bennet (2009) find that 
consumers spend more at a nonprofit organization’s online store when their purchases may 
trigger additional donations by an anonymous donor, and they argue that improved 
perception of the nonprofit’s products explains much of the increase in demand. 
 
2.  eBay  and  Giving  Works 
We analyze data from eBay.com, the world’s largest online marketplace.  eBay 
users traded nearly $60 billion in products during 2007, and currently the site has 88.4 
million active users.  Merchandise traded ranges from less costly items such as 
6 accessories for toys or clothing, to higher-end products including appliances and 
automobiles.  Sellers on eBay offer their goods through “listings” which may be: true 
auctions, in which bids are collected until a specified ending time (usually seven days after 
the auction begins); fixed-price listings in which the seller specifies a price and an ending 
date, often a month or more later; or a hybrid form in which a true auction also includes a 
“buy-it-now” price which a consumer can pay to end the auction immediately.  When a 
seller creates an eBay listing, he or she provides: a title and subtitle, which generally 
contain a brief description of the product for sale; a more detailed description and possibly 
photographs and standardized product specifications; and an auction starting price, 
buy-it-now price, or fixed price, depending on the listing format.  For  consumers  shopping 
on eBay, searching a product category initially returns a set of items for which the title, 
subtitle, starting price, and a single photo are displayed.    To see additional details for any 
individual listing, the consumer clicks to open a separate web page containing the 
remaining information and photos provided by the seller.  For addition details on eBay 
and the practices within it, see the survey article by Bajari and Hortascu (2004). 
eBay employs several mechanisms to facilitate trade.  eBay’s PayPal system 
provides a single, secure platform for users to send payments in a variety of currencies.  
To monitor seller quality, eBay maintains a feedback system.  New users begin with a 
feedback score of zero, and sellers or buyers with whom they have completed transactions 
may add a single point to indicate a positive experience or subtract a single point for a 
negative experience.  Virtually all eBay transactions result in a positive consumer 
evaluation or no evaluation at all, so feedback scores function primarily as descriptors of 
7 user experience, i.e., number of completed transactions.
10  Consumers may obtain 
additional information about seller quality by browsing comments left by other users, or 
reviewing the seller’s performance in a small group of measures (e.g. item as described, 
shipping time) for which eBay began tallying ratings in 2007.  During the period of our 
study, eBay also provided a “power seller” designation (a small symbol next to the seller’s 
name) for high-volume sellers who met minimum customer satisfaction criteria; virtually 
all high feedback sellers had power seller status during this period. 
In 2003 eBay introduced the Giving Works (GW) program, which allows sellers to 
pledge a portion of their listing revenue to a charity of their choosing.  The program is 
administered jointly with MissionFish, a non-profit company owned by the Points of Light 
Institute, a registered charity. GW organizes information on and payments to more than 
12,000 registered non-profit charity groups.  For eBay sellers, participating in the GW 
program is a listing-level choice made along with the standard listing characteristics such 
as starting price.  In addition to selecting the listing’s beneficiary charity, the seller 
chooses a donation percentage from 10% to 100% in increments of 5%.  MissionFish 
receives a small portion of the donation as an administrative fee.  On a GW item’s 
individual web page, along with the usual information provided about any product listing, 
consumers observe the name and logo of the seller’s chosen charity, a short description of 
the charity’s mission, and the percentage of revenue pledged.  When a consumer 
purchases a GW item, Missionfish automatically collects the donation from the seller 
(using payment information on file at eBay), so there is no uncertainty as to whether a 
                                                        
10  In Elfenbein and McManus (2010), for example, the median percentage of positive feedback is 99.8%. 
8 seller will follow through on a donation pledge. 
Sellers who use GW receive two immediate and concrete benefits from the program.   
First, sellers can claim the entire donated sum as a tax-deducible charitable donation 
(consumers who purchase GW items receive no tax benefit).    Second, for each item listed 
through GW, sellers receive a proportional refund on eBay listing fees equal to the 
percentage donated to charity. 
Figure 1 displays quarterly statistics on GW activity for US-based items by 
donation level between 2004 and the first quarter of 2008, with the number of GW listings 
measured on the left axis and the number of unique GW sellers on the right axis.  Use of 
the program increased steadily over the period of our study, with the exception of a decline 
during 2007 Q2 (eBay reports that the use of GW has grown substantially since the end of 
our sample period).  The number of GW listings exhibits some modest seasonality, with 
peak usage typically occurring in the final three months of the year.  Of note is the 
three-fold increase in the number of 10% and mid-level donations between 2005 Q2 and 
2005 Q3, when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, and the subsequent fall in these GW 
listings during 2005 Q4.  During these three quarters, the number of 100% donation 
listings increased steadily.  The figure also shows that the usage of the GW program, as 
measured by the number of unique sellers making a GW listing, peaked during the third 
quarter of 2005, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, but otherwise exhibits an upward 
trend that mirrors the growth of GW listings.  With the exception of the Katrina 
period—during which an average of 6 products were listed on GW for each seller—the 
sellers who used GW created 20 charity listings per quarter on average.  The number of 
9 listings per GW user per quarter exhibited a slight increase over the period for which we 
have data, rising from 15 in 2004 to 23 in 2007. 
 
2.1  Bidder  search 
Consumers may encounter GW listings in three ways.  First, they are presented 
along with standard (non-GW) items whenever the GW products’ characteristics fit the 
terms of a consumer’s search.  Within lists of search results, GW items are distinguished 
by a small blue and yellow ribbon that appears next to the listing title.    GW status does not 
affect the default listing order.  Second, the consumer may use MissionFish or the GW 
program’s central web page to search for listings among all GW listings, or to look for 
those associated with a particular non-profit.  In these cases, consumers generally do not 
see non-GW listings of similar products.  Third, consumers may encounter special GW 
promotions from the eBay’s front page.  These promotions are usually focused on a 
charitable cause or nonprofit organization rather than a product. 
Although there is a wealth of information about products and sellers on eBay, prior 
evidence suggests that consumer search is costly and that bidders do not aggregate all 
relevant information available on the website before making purchase decisions.  In 
particular, Lee and Malmendier (2009) show that (some) eBay bidders win auctions at 
prices higher than contemporary buy-it-now (fixed) prices for the same item and that, 
additionally, the likelihood of this behavior is increasing in how far apart the auction and 
buy-it-now listings are in the eBay search results.    They interpret this as bidders failing to 
pay attention to their full set of opportunities.    Similarly, Ariely and Simonson (2003) and 
10 Sailer (2006) find results consistent with consumer under-searching and possessing high 
imputed search costs, respectively. 
These prior studies suggest that, in forming expectations about seller quality based 
on charity commitments, bidders are unlikely to have a complete view of a seller’s behavior.   
This is particularly challenging in the case of prior donations made by a seller, as 
uncovering this is at best time-consuming and at worst impossible.
11  Overall, this 
literature suggests that any quality inferences by consumers from charity commitments 
would be derived mainly from the presence or absence of a GW donation in the listing of 
interest, rather than a general seller-level quality inference formed by examining the 
complete history of the seller’s giving behavior.    This characterization of consumer search 
supports our approach of focusing on the direct benefits of a charity-linked listing, rather 
than the spillover benefits to a seller’s other listings. 
 
3.  Data 
3.1  Constructing  the  sample 
eBay provided us with a custom extract of product listings which appeared at 
eBay.com between January 2004 and March 2008.  For each quarter during this period, 
we obtained data on every listing by a seller who listed any item through eBay’s Giving 
Works program during that quarter.   From within the extract, which includes 23.5 million 
listings, we identified “experiments” in which a seller posted multiple items with the same 
title, subtitle, and starting price, but possibly with variation in other listing attributes.  In 
                                                        
11 During our period of study, eBay did not make the cumulative donations of a seller available to potential 
bidders. 
11 particular, we are interested in experiments that exhibit variation in the share of revenue 
donated to charity. 
To eliminate potentially confounding sources of variation across and within 
experiments, we narrow the sample in a several ways.  First, we eliminate listings from 
sellers based outside of the U.S.  Second, we drop observations in which a seller offers 
multiple units of an item under a single listing.  Third, we eliminate the 2.4 million 
listings which started in 2004, as many of these have missing data on listing characteristics, 
and the remaining listings with complete data would add little to the subsample we 
analyze.
12  Fourth, we keep only listings that are run as true auctions, although some of 
these include a buy-it-now option.  Fifth, we eliminate observations in which the seller 
independently removes the listing before its ending date (due, for example, to a listing error 
or a lost or broken item).  Listings that end with a buy-it-now sale before the scheduled 
ending date are not affected by this step, nor are listings that fail to sell because they did 
not attract any bids above the reserve price.  Sixth, to reduce the impact of outliers, we 
eliminate observations in which the auction’s starting price, reserve price, or maximum bid 
is above the 99.9th percentile within its respective distribution.  Finally, we eliminate 
from the remaining data any experiments that lack variation in the fraction of revenue 
donated via GW.  We describe the remaining data as our set of seller-product-start price 
experiments (SPSE).  Within this sample we observe 5,015 sellers generating 162,505 
listings which contain 22,610 unique seller-title-subtitle-start price combinations.    We use 
the terms “experiment” and “match” interchangeably to refer to sets of auctions with the 
                                                        
12  Including the data from 2004 would add fewer than 2,000 observations (1.2%) to the sample we analyze. 
12 same seller, title, subtitle, and start price. 
For each observation in the SPSE sample, we utilize data on several auction 
characteristics that are determined by the seller.  These include: the scheduled start and 
end dates; the secret reserve price, if one exists; shipping fees; an indicator for a buy-it-now 
option; indicators for whether the item was listed in bold and (separately) whether it was 
“featured” within listings of bidders’ search results; an indicator for whether a 
stock-keeping unit (SKU) was provided;
13 the number of photos included on the listing 
page, top-coded at 8; and the item’s eBay product category designation, which may include 
up to six distinct hierarchical descriptions that range from a general category (e.g. 
“Consumer Electronics”) to a narrow set of products (e.g. “iPod Shuffle”).  In addition, 
for each auction we observe the following variables which are determined by bidders’ 
responses to the listing: the number of bids; the maximum bid value submitted; an indicator 
for whether the item was sold; and the sale price of an item, provided it sold.  A third of 
listings in our SPSE sample ended in a sale, but a greater fraction attracted bids –– in 6% of 
listings, consumers submitted bids but no sale occurred because the greatest bid was below 
the (hidden) reserve.  Finally, for each listing we observe several characteristics of the 
seller: the seller’s feedback rating at the beginning of each auction; the date that the seller 
created his eBay account (used to calculate the seller’s “age” at the auction’s start date); 
and the seller’s home city and state.    As the convention among eBay users is to provide a 
single unit of positive feedback for each transaction, and more than 99% of feedback 
                                                        
13  eBay allows sellers to provide a SKU for a product at no cost.    We take the presence of a SKU to indicate 
that the product for sale meets well-known, verifiable, specifications, and hence that opportunities to 
misrepresent the product are minimized. 
13 ratings are positive, the seller’s feedback score is essentially proportional to the number of 
transactions he has conducted on eBay, with equal weight given to purchases and sales. 
In assembling and analyzing the SPSE sample, we assume that products within a 
match are identical.  This data collection process is likely to lead to under-matching in 
which we fail to capture identical products that have different titles.    For example, a seller 
might add the phrase “donation to the Red Cross” to a listing’s subtitle for otherwise 
identical products and listings, but we exclude the affected observations from our analysis.   
Although under-matching reduces our sample size, we do not expect these omitted 
observations to introduce bias to our analysis.  Our matching rule also may suffer from 
over-matching, in which a seller assigns the same title, subtitle, and start price to products 
which actually differ.  If Giving Works status is correlated with characteristics which we 
do not observe but are apparent to sellers and bidders, our estimates of charity impact could 
be biased.  However, in Appendix Table A1, we present regression results which indicate 
that observable within-match variation in other listing characteristics is uncorrelated with 
GW status.  Further, when we limit the sample to experiments that match on many 
seller-selected characteristics, we find that our results are largely  unchanged.  Hence,  it  is 
unlikely that unobserved variability from selection into GW is behind our results. 
The experiments we analyze are a small fraction of sellers’ GW activity.    Between 
January 2004 and March 2008 we observe 78,037 unique sellers with at least one GW 
listing.  Our sample contains 23.5 million eBay listings, of which 2.1 million are GW 
items.  About 5,600 sellers acted as non-profits and always donated all of their revenue, 
but these sellers account for only 150,000 listings.  Thus the bulk of GW activity is by 
14 sellers who attempt to profit from their sales (at least sometimes) and also do not engage in 
experiments, as we define them here.
14  In this paper, we take no stand on whether the 
“experiments” we observe are examples of sellers trying to learn about GW’s benefits or 
are, instead, cases in which sellers’ philanthropic motives lead them to use GW for some 
portion of their eBay activity.  Rather, we exploit this experimental variation to assess 
consumer response to GW. 
Among for-profit sellers who use GW, charity listings are about 9% of all eBay 
activity.    The share is slightly lower among the 3,062 sellers who appear more than 1,000 
times in the full data.  In 73% of GW listings by for-profit sellers, 100% of revenue is 
pledged to charity, and an additional 18% of listings pledge 10% of revenue.  When we 
examine the frequency of GW use by for-profit sellers during 2004-08 and control for 
seller-level average GW frequency, we find that sellers typically reduce their GW use as 
their eBay feedback ratings increase.  This is consistent with charity listings being a 
substitute for accumulated feedback in assuring consumers that a seller or product is of 
high quality.    (Alternatively, it is also consistent with sellers learning that charity auctions 
do not generate positive returns.) 
 
3.2  Summary  statistics 
In Tables 1-3 we present summary statistics from the SPSE sample.  Table 1 
contains information on the 5,015 unique sellers in the data.  Sellers average 4.5 distinct 
                                                        
14  Recall that our sample of experimental sellers comprised 5,015 sellers and 162,505 listings.    If we were to 
expand the matched data to include listings in non-auction formats and without the restriction that start prices 
are identical, we would add only 4,841 additional sellers and 127,000 listings. 
15 title-subtitle-start price combinations and 32.4 listings in total.  About 30 sellers account 
for nearly half of the SPSE data, so the median numbers of matches and listings are 
considerably smaller.    We report in Table 1 an individual seller’s average age (in days) and 
feedback rating by taking the mean across all of the seller’s listings within the sample.  
Consistent with the skewing of the data by some large sellers, the mean feedback value is 
889, while the median is 148.    In the analysis of Section 4, we allow for changes over time 
in sellers’ feedback over the sample period, computing the mean feedback level for the set 
of auctions in each experiment.    Among the 2,021 sellers with multiple experiments in the 
SPSE data, the average seller is active in 1.9 eBay top-level categories and 2.6 categories at 
the next level in the hierarchy. 
In Table 2 we display match-level characteristics of the SPSE data.  We focus on 
variation in auction characteristics within each match.  The average match has half of its 
listings associated with GW.  However, larger matches tend to have a relatively high 
fraction of charity listings so that overall we observe more GW listings than non-GW.  A 
small fraction of matches (2.8%) include variation in reserve price, and a small additional 
number (1.9%) have a uniform reserve that is greater than the posted starting price.  
Shipping fees vary in a relatively large share (12.5%) of matches, but the median standard 
deviation of shipping fees ($0.87) within an experiment with any variation is small relative 
to the median ($4.99).  Within-match variation is rare for bold status, featured status, or 
the presence of a SKU, with each varying in about 2% of matches.  Photo counts and the 
presence of a buy-it-now option are more likely to vary within a match (4.9% and 8.7%, 
respectively).    In many cases, there is within-match variation in multiple attributes so that 
16 73% of all matches have no variation in any of the variables mentioned above.  Auction 
length, however, varies relatively frequently within a match: 28% of matches include some 
variation in scheduled duration.   
Table 3 contains auction-level summary statistics from the SPSE sample.  The 
median listing neither sells nor attracts a bid, but among the 33% of auctions that are 
successful the mean price is $78.31 (median $22.22).    With our sample of 162,505 listings, 
this implies total revenue of $4.2 million.    While only 5% of matches include observations 
with a secret reserve above the start price, the frequency of this choice among high-volume 
sellers yields distinct reserve and start prices in 39% of the SPSE listings.  For each 
non-charity item within a match, we computed the minimum number of days between its 
own start date and the nearest start date for a GW item in the same SPSE match.  The 
average across minimum differences is 48 days, and the median is 21 days.  While the 
modal auction length of seven days implies that side-by-side comparisons of matched GW 
and non-charity listings were often impossible, 26% of the non-charity listings have a 
minimum difference of 7 days or fewer.  Within the GW auctions, about two-thirds have 
all revenue donated to charity, and a quarter of auctions donate 10% of revenue.  The 
third-most common donation value, 50%, appears in only 2.5% of Giving Works auctions 
in the SPSE sample.    Overall, this suggests that for most sellers, the “natural experiments” 
we observe are not, in general, created by sellers who are using these matched listings to 
learn about the profitability of GW sales in a systematic way. 
There is relatively little within-seller variation in positive donation rates – 20 
percent of the GW listings in our final dataset come from sellers with only 10 percent 
17 donation levels, and an additional 61 percent come from sellers with exclusively 100 
percent donations.    For the subset of 10-percent-only sellers, it is possible that the primary 
purpose of experimentation is to learn about the GW premium.
15 
 
4.  Results 
Our analysis proceeds in four parts.    We begin by estimating the average impact of 
charitable donations across the SPSE sample.  Next we examine the heterogeneity of the 
charity impact across sellers with different levels of experience to explore whether charity 
tie-ins may provide credible signals to consumers about seller quality.  Third, we explore 
whether charity tie-ins can lead to higher profits.  Finally, we compare the charity impact 
immediately following Hurricane Katrina and also during the holiday season to the charity 
impact at other times to examine the degree to which the charity premiums may be driven 
by consumers who value “charity for charity’s sake.” 
To estimate the consumer response to charity tie-ins, we employ the following basic 
specification: 
Yism = αsm + β′DONATIONism + θ′CONTROLSism + εism       (1) 
where s indexes the seller, m represents a title-subtitle-start-price matched group of listings, 
and i is a subindex within each group for a specific listing; α is a fixed-effect by group and 
seller.  We explore consumer responses to charity tie-ins by examining four different 
dependent variables (Y): the probability of sale, the number of bids submitted at or above 
                                                        
15 It is possible that 100 percent sellers expect to augment their reputations through GW listings. However, 
given the limited ability of buyers to observe past charitable behavior, we believe that 100 percent GW 
listings by for-profit sellers most likely represent an efficient means of making a (private) charitable donation.   
For our purposes, these auctions are nonetheless useful for understanding consumer response to seller charity. 
18 the starting price, the natural log of the ending price of the auction if the product did sell,
16 
and the natural log of the maximum bid submitted by any bidder.    The variables included 
in DONATION reflect the presence and levels of charitable donations via GW, and vary by 
specification.  CONTROLS includes indicator variables for use of bold titles and featured 
status in the item listing; indicators for the scheduled length of the listing and day of the 
week on which the listing was expected to close; the number of pictures provided in the 
listing; an indicator variable reflecting whether “buy-it-now” was an option; controls for 
differences in shipping and reserve prices across items in the match;
17 and the scheduled 
end date of the auction, which allows us to control for time trends in demand for identical 
items on the site.    In all of the analyses that follow, we report standard errors clustered by 
seller since the main variation of interest is at the seller level.    Additionally, this approach 
helps account for the widely varying numbers of listings by seller in our dataset.
18 
 
4.1    The average charity impact 
We report the average impact of charity in Table 4, using a binary variable that 
equals one if any amount is donated to charity and zero otherwise.    Column (1) reports the 
impact of charity tie-ins on the probability of sale using a linear probability model.  The 
linear model facilitates interpretation of the marginal effects of charity, and generates very 
similar results to a conditional fixed effects logit model.  As with a fixed effects logit 
                                                        
16 If there is only one bidder, this value is equal to the starting price, otherwise it reflect the second-highest 
bidders’ bid. 
17 For both shipping fees and (separately) reserve prices, we take the difference between any individual 
listing’s value of the variable and the minimum across all values in match m.  In our empirical models we 
include both this difference and its square as controls. 
18 We also find in unreported results that dropping sellers with large numbers of SPSE listings has little 
impact on our point estimates. 
19 specification, we omit observations where either none or all of the listings within a group 
result in sales.
19 
We find that having a charity listing is associated with a 10.1 percentage point 
higher probability of sale (significantly different from zero at p < .01).  Given the mean 
sale probability of 33 percent, this represents a 30 percent increase in the likelihood of 
making a sale.  In the remaining columns, we present different measures of consumers’ 
responses to charity status.    In column (2) we see that GW auctions attract on average 0.26 
more bids, and columns (3) and (4) indicate that there is a 4 percent sales price premium 
associated with GW auctions, conditional on a sale taking place.  None of the controls 
have a consistently significant sign, apart from Featured, which has a positive impact on 
sale probability and price. 
In Table 5, we incorporate variables in DONATION that reflect the fractions of total 
item revenue that will be donated to charity.    As expected, sale probability, number of bids, 
log of price, and log of highest bid all increase monotonically in the donation rate.    These 
results indicate that, for otherwise near-identical auctions, greater charitable contributions 
are more likely to lead to sales and elicit higher selling prices.  The coefficients reported 
here are comparable to those reported by Elfenbein and McManus (2010). 
 
4.2  Heterogeneity  of  charity  impact by seller experience 
As discussed in the introduction, there are two primary explanations for consumers’ 
                                                        
19 If we keep these observations, the implied effect of GW is – as would be expected – somewhat lower, 
given the likely bias towards zero of all coefficients.    Our main results remain qualitatively (and statistically) 
similar; tables utilizing this larger sample are available from the authors. 
20 higher willingness to pay for charity-linked products – direct utility from donating to the 
charity itself, or because they believe that the charity-linked product is somehow of higher 
quality.  The quality signaling story suggests that the benefits of GW should be lower for 
sellers with an alternate means of  demonstrating  quality.  A  natural alternative in the case 
of eBay is feedback from customers.  We therefore examine how GW’s effect on sales 
probability and the log of the maximum bid varies with seller feedback.  We use the 
highest bid (rather than price) because the bid value always reflects a bidder’s choice, 
whereas auctions with a single bid will close with a price that reflects the seller’s choice of 
starting price.   
In Table 6, we repeat the analysis in Table 4, adding the interaction term 
Charity*log(Feedback) and also a set of interactions by Feedback quartile.
20  In  all  cases, 
these interaction terms take on negative values and are significant at the 1 percent level, 
indicating a lower GW premium for higher-feedback sellers.
21    In columns (2) and (4), the 
specifications based on feedback quartiles, we see that for the lowest quartile of seller 
feedback, the increase in sale probability associated with GW auctions is 38.5 percentage 
points, and the increase in maximum bid is 17 percent.  The coefficients describe a 
monotonic decrease in the GW premium as a function of seller feedback, with premiums of 
5.4 percentage points on sales probability and 1.6 percent on bids for the highest quartile.
22  
Table 7 once again allows for a differential effect by donation level, with a full set of 
                                                        
20  The feedback cutoffs between quartiles are 30, 146.5, and 526.2. 
21 We also estimated specifications (1) and (3) of Table 6 while restricting the SPSE sample to the 
observations that have no within-match variation in bold, featured, number of photos, buy-it-now option, 
secret reserve price, or shipping cost. The implied effect of charity (and its interaction with feedback) are 
similar to that of the full sample 
22 The GW coefficients for fourth-quartile sellers in the Sold and log(Max. Bid) models are significantly 
different from zero at p < 0.01 and p < 0.10 respectively. 
21 interactions between donation share and feedback measures.    In all cases, the benefits of a 
charity tie-in are diminished for higher feedback sellers. 
In Table 8 we present a set of robustness checks.    First, we examine whether seller 
feedback might be proxying for the prevalence of “commodity” auctions.  If there is less 
scope for opportunistic behavior in commodity sales, then there would be less potential for 
quality signaling for such products.  Our proxy for commodity auctions is whether the 
item for sale has an SKU associated with it, and we look at whether the inclusion of 
Charity*SKU affects our main results on seller feedback.    The results, in columns (1) and 
(2), imply relatively little difference by SKU status, and our results on feedback are 
unchanged by the inclusion of the SKU controls.   
Columns (3) and (4) include seller age as a control, interacted with Charity.  
Surprisingly, given the colinearity of age and feedback, our main results are unchanged.  
The coefficients on the log(Seller age) terms are small and only marginally significant.  
We display the results of further robustness tests in columns (5) through (10).    We interact 
Charity with seller category concentration,
23 item start price, and a full set of dummy 
variables for the seller’s home state.  These controls similarly have little effect on our 
main results.
24  In summary, our results indicate that GW auctions generate the greatest 
seller benefits for low feedback sellers.  We argue that this is because charity tie-ins 
substitute for seller feedback and are seen by buyers as a credible quality signal. 
                                                        
23 We calculate the share of a seller’s listings in the full data that occur within the same top-level product 
category as the SPSE observations. 
24 We also repeated our analyses limiting ourselves to the set of GW listings that do not overlap with their 
matched non-GW listings. We obtain virtually identical results, which helps to rule out the possibility of 
reputational spillovers across auctions. It also is inconsistent with the feedback-charity interaction resulting 
from high-feedback sellers simply being those with many simultaneous auctions, where the GW premium is 
attenuated because of cross-listing reputational spillovers. 
22  
4.3  Are  charity  tie-ins  directly  profitable? 
For charity links to act as informative signals of seller quality, it must be the case 
that opportunistic sellers are not tempted to use charity links to boost profits.
25  The  basic 
condition is that the financial benefit to a seller from higher sale probabilities and prices 
cannot exceed the cost of donating.  We compare selling strategies in which a seller 
commits to offering an item via GW until it sells or outside of GW until it sells.  If the 
expected non-charity price of an item is pn, conditional on selling, the probability of a 
non-charity sale is πn, and β is the per-listing-period discount rate, then the present 
discounted value of revenue from committing to non-charity listings is Vn = πnpn + 
(1–πn)βVn.  The discounted revenue value from a GW listing (g), which may have a 
different sale probability and price, is Vg = πg (1–γ)pg + (1–πg)βVg, where γ is the fraction of 
revenue donated to charity.  In the Appendix we extend these expressions to account for 
eBay fees, which are partially discounted in GW listings, and the daily decline in sale 
probabilities and expected prices which we report in Table 3.    Even if using GW provides 
no price premium and sellers are perfectly patient, an increase in sale probability has the 
benefit of reducing (expected) future fees from re-listing unsold items.  In Table A2 we 
explore the expected value of pursuing a GW selling strategy using 10% donations and 
compare it to the expected value of the non-GW selling strategy.  In our calculations we 
employ the predicted price premium for 10% GW listings, which we report separately in 
Table A3.    This analysis shows that 10% donations do not provide a greater present value 
                                                        
25 In this section, we assume that sellers are businesses which would deduct the charitable contribution as a 
business expense.    For this set of sellers, there are no tax benefits of GW sales. 
23 net of fees and donations than committing to non-GW listings.  On average across the 
sample, pursuing a 10% donation strategy to sell an item yields 93.9% of the net discounted 
revenue of selling via a non-GW strategy.  Even for low-feedback sellers, the benefits of 
pursuing a 10% donation strategy yields 95.9% of the discounted revenue of a non-GW 
strategy.
26  For low-feedback sellers, the greater benefit of 10% donations may be that 
they allow items to be sold sooner (i.e. with fewer re-listings), which allows positive 
feedback to accumulate more quickly.  One caveat to this analysis is that starting prices 
across GW and non-GW auctions, which are identical in our SPSE sample, may not be 
equal if each is set to maximize seller profit.   
 
4.4    Variation in the salience of charitable giving 
The results above suggest that charity pledges have a substantial impact on sale 
probabilities and bids in auctions by low-feedback sellers, but consumers have only a 
modest response to Giving Works listings by high-feedback sellers.  This is largely 
consistent with a view that consumers infer a quality signal from seller charity, but derive 
relatively limited direct utility from charity-linked purchases.  We now ask whether the 
data are ever consistent with consumers deriving substantial utility benefits from charity 
sales.  To answer this question, we examine whether events that draw attention to worthy 
causes affect the sale probabilities and price premiums associated with Giving Works.    We 
focus on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on August 30, 2005 and 
spurred a period of near-record giving by Americans who rushed to donate to relief efforts.   
                                                        
26  See the notes below Table A2 for the numerical assumptions for these calculations. 
24 We define the post-Katrina period as September 1 to November 30, 2005, and we add 
Katrina Era and the interaction Charity*Katrina Era to the basic models we described in 
Table 4.
27    Consistent with an increased focus on charitable causes following Katrina, we 
find that GW listings received an additional 9.7 percentage point increase in sales 
probability.  In columns (3) and (4) we limit the sample to sellers with above-median 
feedback and show that their Katrina-era gains in GW sale probability and maximum bid 
are substantial, which is consistent with the Katrina effect acting through feelings of 
altruism and/or warm glow among customers.  In columns (5) and (6) we show that the 
Katrina-era changes to sale probability and maximum bid were concentrated among the 
nonprofit organizations specifically associated with hurricane relief efforts.
28  Listings 
associated with relief-oriented charities experienced a 16 percentage point increase in sale 
probability relative to their baseline charity premium, while GW listings not associated 
with hurricane relief performed equally well within and outside of the Katrina era.
29   
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we examine whether there is an annual increase in 
charity appeal during the period between Thanksgiving and New Year’s Eve.    We create a 
Holidays dummy variable to denote listings which started on Thanksgiving or later and 
ended on New Year’s Eve or earlier, and we interact this variable with the indicator Charity. 
In contrast to the Katrina results, we do not find any change in the GW premium in this 
                                                        
27 The variable Katrina Era is identified by variation within a match in whether listings occur during the 
months following Katrina. 
28   Following Hurricane Katrina, the federal government identified 93 charities as approved relief 
organizations (www.opm.gov/cfc/disasters/Katrina-relief.asp).  We identified these charities, their local 
chapters, plus all other hurricane- or gulf coast-related groups as being associated with Katrina relief. 
29  It is noteworthy that Katrina charities command smaller premiums outside of the post-Katrina period. This 
pattern holds for all donation levels. We do not have an adequate explanation for this result, but hope to 
explore it in further work that delves more deeply into heterogeneity in GW by charity type. 
25 period.
30  Overall, these results suggest that charity links generate widespread consumer 
responses only when consumers perceive the charitable need as unusually large. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper is among the first to consider what types of firms can influence 
consumer behavior through charitable contributions.  This research objective is directly 
related to firms’ motivations for tying market transactions to public goods donations, and 
also consumers’ inferences in response to these ties.  One possibility is that firms attempt 
to use charity purely to increase profit, and if consumers correctly infer this motive, then 
consumers’ incremental responses to charity links should reflect only their utility value 
from the charitable action.    A second view suggests that charitable actions by firms act as 
credible signals of quality or trustworthiness, and positive consumer responses will 
incorporate both their own value for the public good and also their belief that the market 
transaction will be conducted favorably. 
We explore these theories using a large sample of eBay listings, matched by seller, 
product, and start price.  This sample comprises more than 22,000 “experiments” run by 
eBay sellers from January 2005 to March 2008, generating more than $4.2 million in 
product sales.  This data set allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across 
sellers and products in a real market environment.    It also allows us to examine difference 
in the impact of charity tie-ins across sellers with different attributes, a question which 
                                                        
30  In addition to the results described here and reported in Table 9, we investigated whether there is an annual 
change to the GW effect during September through November more generally, which might explain the 
results in columns (1) and (2).    We found that this “Katrina placebo” has no impact on GW sale probabilities 
or maximum bids.    We also investigated the impact of Katrina-era GW listings by donation level, as in Table 
5, and found that changes to charity salience have an impact across donation levels. 
26 would be nearly impossible to replicate in a field experiment.  A final advantage of our 
approach is that it allows us to examine the role of bundling private and public goods in a 
setting in which marketing efforts of firms are not conflated with choices to commit to 
charitable donations.    While these marketing efforts may be important for firms to get the 
full returns from charitable commitments, they may obfuscate the relative importance of 
the charitable donation itself. 
Our analysis has three main findings.  First, consistent with Elfenbein and 
McManus (2010) we find that charity links have positive but limited impacts on consumer 
demand: products that trigger charitable donations have a higher likelihood of sale, attract 
more bids, and sell for higher prices than those that do not—even when controlling for 
heterogeneity in sellers and start prices.  Moreover, the charity impact is stronger the 
larger the fraction donated to charity.  Second, we find that low-feedback sellers benefit 
much more than high-feedback sellers when pledging charitable donations.    Together with 
the fact that the overall direct returns are negative—even from 10% donations and even 
among low-feedback sellers—this result supports the signaling view of corporate 
philanthropy proposed by Fisman, Heal, and Nair (2006): other-regarding, altruistic sellers   
may credibly signal their trustworthiness by committing to make a donation to charity.    In 
the presence of little information about the reliability of a seller, charity commitments play 
a significant role in establishing trust.  Once the seller has established a history of 
reliability, the relative value of this signal is diminished.  Finally, we show that the value 
consumers place on charity may be affected by shocks that increase the salience of 
charitable giving.    Following Hurricane Katrina, the impact of charitable commitments on 
27 the sale probability and price nearly doubled.    These effects are observed for high and low 
feedback sellers alike, indicating that while quality signaling may be an important function 
of corporate philanthropy, in certain situations the commercial impact of charity tie-ins may 
be driven by the utility benefits consumers receive from contributing to public goods.   
Overall the patterns we observe in the data suggest that consumer responses to 
charity tie-ins are driven both by opportunities for firms or managers with other-regarding 
preferences to signal their type and also – at least in certain situations – from the increment 
to consumers’ utility that comes directly from purchasing the private-public goods bundle.  
Our results suggest that a full model of consumer choice might nest these considerations.  
Outside options, such as the ability to contribute directly to the public good of one’s choice, 
may place strict limits on the ability of firms to directly appropriate the utility value of the 
bundle and effectively eliminate any arbitrage opportunities to raise profits from charity 
links (Elfenbein and McManus, 2010).    These limits, in turn, create a separating condition 
that enables consumers to rationally infer that charity tie-ins are much more likely to be 
pursued by other-regarding firms or managers, and hence may serve as a signal of quality, 
as proposed by Fisman et al. (2006).     
Our paper has a number of limitations.  A maintained assumption behind our 
investigation of signaling is that consumers have only imperfect information about the 
current and historical charity activity of eBay sellers.    We believe that this assumption is a 
reasonable one, because eBay does not record or reveal a seller’s charitable donations for 
the use of potential customers.  Although it is certainly possible to construct at least a 
recent history of giving for a particular seller, in the eBay context this is relatively time 
28 consuming.  However, to the extent that potential bidders do investigate sellers and draw 
quality inferences from charitable donations, our estimates for signaling will be 
under-estimated.  A second limitation of this paper is that our assessment of the full 
benefits of charitable endeavors is incomplete.  In future work, we seek to address the 
degree to which charity tie-ins are useful in building valuable reputations, in repairing 
reputations after bad outcomes, and in generating spillover benefits to other products.  
Finally, while our paper provides suggestive evidence that consumers’ perceptions of 
sellers’ quality may be a driving force behind the impact of charitable commitments, we 
cannot conclusively distinguish the signaling model from other possibilities, such as 
affinity or reciprocity (Sugden, 1984; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Charness, Rigotti, and 
Rustichini, 2007; Croson, 2007).  While these alternative explanations are possible, they 
are difficult to reconcile with our findings that the benefits of seller charity accrue primarily 
to low feedback sellers. These alternative explanations would require a strong relationship 
between sellers’ size and consumers’ preferences. 
The current paper represents a first step in understanding why firms perceive 
different levels of consumer benefit from charity tie-ins and green or ethical production.  
The evidence – albeit anecdotal – of the benefits of such practices is mixed.    Vogel (2006), 
for example, examines the efforts of Starkist, Ciba, Ford, and British Petroleum to benefit 
from environmentally friendly production.  He reports that executives at these firms 
conclude that customers are not willing to pay more for their “green” products.    While our 
study does not address this issue directly, it does raise the possibility that consumers may 
make different inferences about firms’ charitable actions based on the characteristics of the 
29 firm.  Large firms such as these – with well-established reputations and product lines – 
may not generate quality-signaling benefits from philanthropy or green practices.   
However, we are only at the very early stages of analyzing and understanding the 
inferences that consumers make from firms’ contributions to public goods. 
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32 Appendix 
Suppose a seller has an item to sell on eBay.  The cost of obtaining the item is 
sunk, so we ignore it here.    The seller has two auction formats (i) available: Giving Works 
(g) and non-Giving Works (n).  Let πi represent the probability of the item selling under 
format i during period (week) 0, when the item is first listed.    Let pi be the expected price 
of the item under format i during period 0, conditional on the item selling.  If the item 
fails to sell during a listing period, the seller can re-list it and attempt to sell it again during 
the next period.  Future periods are discounted at rate β.  The price in period t is 
expected to be pi  
 , where δp is the weekly decline in the item’s price.  The per-period 
sales probability declines at rate δs. 
We consider the value of selling the item under two strategies.  First, the seller 
may commit to selling the item outside of GW, and relist the item as many times as 
necessary until it sells.    Second, the seller may commit to using GW to list the item until it 
sells, with a pledged donation of γ.    The present discounted values of these two strategies 
are Vn and Vg, respectively.    We do not allow the seller to switch between formats g and n 
or consider changing γ.  The  values  Vi include eBay’s listing fees, which are dependent on 
whether an item sells and its price conditional on selling.  Let c denote the component of 
listing fees that are independent of whether an item sells, and let f be the additional fee 
conditional on an item selling.    Under Giving Works, the seller is responsible to pay only 
(1–γ) of c and f.  We note further that eBay uses a two-part tariff for final value fees.  
Below $25, denote the marginal final value fee as f1 and above $25 denote it as f2. 
When the final price is above $25 and neither price nor sales probability decline 
33 over time, the P V in m o m a e cursively as:  D  of sell g an ite  under f r at n m y be writt n re
                      ,  or           25    25         1      
     
               2 5       25       
 1    1        
. 
When the final price is less than $25 and pn and πn are constant, the PDV of selling an item 
under format n is: 
     
                 
 1    1        
. 
If pn and πn can change over time, then Vn is complicated slightly by the interaction of eBay 
fees with the price decline, but the expression remains easy to evaluate numerically.    This 
is the approach we follow in Table A2. 
When the seller follows the GW strategy in auctions with constant expected prices 
and sales probabilities, the recursive expressions above may be extended to include the 
donation parameter γ.  For a final price above $25, the PDV of selling an item under 
format g is: 
           1         25         or               25             1        1    
     
     1                 25        25       1      
 1    1        
. 
When price is below $25 but all other assumptions remain fixed, the PDV of selling an 
item while pledging a 10% dona o ti n is: 
     
    1     1            1      
 1    1         
. 
As in the non-GW selling strategy, we evaluate Vg numerically to accommodate weekly 
changes in sales price and probability. 
  






























































Notes: The axis on left is for the number of charity listings per quarter.  The axis on the right is for the 





Table 1: SPSE data by seller 
(N = 5,015) 
 
 Mean  Median  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
       
N Matches  4.51  1  30.96  1  1356 
N Listings  32.40  4  298.49  2  14642 
Avg. feedback  889.34  148.25  4485.45  0  136297.4 
Avg. age (days) *  1373.24  1284.49  984.39  0  4064.3 
N Meta categories *  1.90  1  1.81  1  25 
N Level 2 categories *  2.64  2  4.18  1  83 
       
 
Notes: Seller age is not available for all sellers; N = 4,723.  The last two rows limit the sample to sellers 




Table 2: SPSE data by match 
(N=22,610) 
 
 Mean  Median  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
          
N Listings  7.19  3  19.17  2  1092 
Donation > 0 (1= yes)  0.50  0.5  0.20  0.002  0.996 
Difference in start date  34.84  14.31  58.69  0  866 
          
Indicator on whether match has variation in…       
Reserve price  0.028  0  0.166  0  1 
Shipping fee  0.125  0  0.330  0  1 
Scheduled length  0.278  0  0.448  0  1 
Bold 0.026  0  0.158  0  1 
Featured 0.014  0  0.118  0  1 
Buy-it-now option  0.087  0  0.281  0  1 
SKU present  0.014  0  0.117  0  1 
Photo Count  0.049  0  0.216  0  1 




36 Table 3: SPSE data by listing 
  (N = 162,505) 
 
 Mean  Median  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
        
Success  0.33 0  0.47 0 1 
Number  of  bids    2.63 0  6.07 0  159 
Sale price*  78.31  22.22  244.58  0.01  4450 
Maximum bid*  223.96 31.11  520.37  0.01  6602 
Start  price  42.10 9.99 189.70 0.01  9999 
Reserve price  147.88  12.59  541.46  0.01  9999 
Shipping fee  6.26  4.99  12.34  0  3595 
Scheduled  length  6.23 7  2.05 1  30 
Actual  length  6.02 7  2.21 0  30 
Bold  0.03 0  0.18 0 1 
Featured  0.02 0  0.13 0 1 
Buy-it-now  option  0.33 0  0.47 0 1 
SKU  present  0.38 0  0.49 0 1 
Photo  Count  1.24 1  1.19 0 8 
         
Non-Giving Works only (N = 75,618)      
Days between own start 
and nearest charity start 
47.75 21  78.52  0  964 
         
Giving Works only (N = 86,887)       
Donate  10%  0.27 0  0.44 0 1 
Donate 15-95%  0.10 0  0.30 0 1 
Donate  100%  0.63 1  0.48 0 1 
          
Notes: N for sale price is 54,416.    N for maximum bid is 63,689.     
  
37 Table 4: Baseline effect of charity on sale probability and price 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.  Sold  # Bids  log(Price)  log(Maximum bid) 
Charity 0.102***  0.265***  0.0380***  0.0402*** 
(0.0159) (0.0519)  (0.0108) (0.0104) 
Bold 0.0185  -0.102  0.0264  0.0374 
(0.0308) (0.178)  (0.0278)  (0.0356) 
Featured 0.0486  1.747***  0.126***  0.0972** 
(0.0504) (0.580)  (0.0380)  (0.0392) 
Ending Monday  0.0110  0.0610  0.0114  0.0157 
(0.0114) (0.0401)  (0.0116) (0.0101) 
Ending Tuesday  0.00751  0.0575  0.00766  0.0170 
(0.00759) (0.0359)  (0.00754) (0.0116) 
Ending Wednesday  -0.00557  0.0447  0.00464  0.0163 
(0.0112) (0.0578)  (0.0111) (0.0116) 
Ending Thursday  0.00617  0.0731  0.0125*  0.0198** 
(0.00777) (0.0459)  (0.00753)  (0.00939) 
Ending Friday  0.00106  0.140  0.0195**  0.0269*** 
(0.0115) (0.0884)  (0.00810)  (0.00855) 
Ending Saturday  -0.0176**  0.0132  0.0192*  0.0191* 
(0.00827) (0.0372) (0.0104)  (0.0110) 
# of Pictures  0.0215*  0.244  0.0280  0.0222 
(0.0117) (0.196)  (0.0219)  (0.0218) 
Auction end date  -5.09e-05  -0.00255*  -0.000175***  -0.000273*** 
(4.15e-05) (0.00154)  (5.15e-05) (3.41e-05) 
Buy it now  0.0665***  -0.350***  -0.00841  -0.0610** 
(0.0218) (0.0981)  (0.0280) (0.0262) 
Reserve difference  -0.0824*  -1.175***  0.0656***  -0.00124 
(0.0466) (0.164)  (0.0171)  (0.00696) 
(Reserve difference)
2 0.00206*  0.0280***  -0.00194***  -6.59e-05 
(0.00119) (0.00467)  (0.000618)  (0.000255) 
Shipping difference  -0.00270  -0.0480**  -0.00149  -0.00422 
(0.00318) (0.0234)  (0.00345)  (0.00331) 
(Shipping difference)
2 2.53e-05  1.35e-05**  -5.38e-08  2.19e-05 
   (3.73e-05)  (6.58e-06)  (3.28e-05)  (3.54e-05) 
Observations 104083  162766  54487  63841 
R-squared 0.014  0.014  0.007  0.008 
Notes: We also include dummy variables for auction length (1, 3, 5, or 10+ days, with 7 as the excluded value), 
but do not report these estimates due to space constraints.  Ending day is scheduled (not actual) ending day of 
week.  Reserve difference is calculated as auction i’s reserve price minus the minimum reserve price in i’s 
group of matched auctions.  Shipping difference is calculated similarly.  Standard errors, clustered on seller, 
are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at p = 0.01, ** for p = 0.05, and * for p = 0.10. 
  
38 Table 5: Baseline effect of donation percentage on sale probability and price 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.  Sold  # Bids  log(Price)  log(Maximum bid) 
Donation=10% 0.0586***  0.106***  0.0215**  0.0217** 
(0.0118) (0.0368)  (0.0103)  (0.00917) 
10%<Donation<100% 0.102***  0.286***  0.0354*  0.0474** 
(0.0196) (0.0553)  (0.0211)  (0.0186) 
Donation=100% 0.137***  0.410***  0.0638***  0.0617** 
   (0.0333)  (0.109)  (0.0238)  (0.0240) 
Observations 104083  162766  54487  63841 
R-squared 0.015  0.014  0.007  0.008 
Notes:  We include the same listing-specific control variables as listed in Table 4 but refrain from reporting 
coefficients due to space constraints.  Standard errors, clustered on seller, are in parentheses.  *** indicates 
significance at p = 0.01, ** for p = 0.05, and * for p = 0.10. 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of feedback on "charity premium" in sale probability and price 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Var.  Sold  Sold  log(Maximum bid)  log(Maximum bid) 
Charity  0.332*** 0.386*** 0.132*** 0.171*** 
(0.0574) (0.0728) (0.0328) (0.0458) 
log(Feedback)  -0.0324***  -0.0132*** 
    *Charity  (0.00758)    (0.00392) 
Feedback_Q2   -0.217***  -0.115** 
    *Charity    (0.0764)  (0.0510) 
Feedback_Q3   -0.286***  -0.136*** 
    *Charity    (0.0746)  (0.0490) 
Feedback_Q4   -0.332***  -0.155*** 
    *Charity    (0.0733)  (0.0467) 
Observations 103650  104083  63294  63689 
R-squared  0.019 0.021 0.009 0.010 
Notes:  Standard errors, clustered on seller, are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at p = 0.01, ** for p 




Table 7: Effect of feedback on "charity premium" in sale probability and price, by donation share. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Var.  Sold  Sold  log(Maximum bid)  log(Maximum bid)
Donation=10% 0.166***  0.123***  0.0631***  0.0423 
(0.0288) (0.0320)  (0.0238) (0.0383) 
10%<Donation<100% 0.308*** 0.302*** 0.111*  0.257*** 
(0.0638) (0.0907)  (0.0568) (0.0701) 
Donation=100% 0.553***  0.539***  0.266***  0.246*** 
(0.103) (0.0885)  (0.0718)  (0.0583) 
Donation=10% -0.0136***    -0.00547**   
       *log(Feedback)  (0.00368)    (0.00279)   
10%<Donation<100% -0.0297***    -0.0102   
       *log(Feedback)  (0.00820)    (0.00756)   
Donation=100% -0.0640***    -0.0322***   
       *log(Feedback)  (0.0138)    (0.00953)   
Donation=10%   0.0250    0.00487 
       *Feedback_Q2    (0.0464)    (0.0453) 
Donation=10%   -0.0515    -0.0114 
       *Feedback_Q3    (0.0405)    (0.0444) 
Donation=10%   -0.0893***    -0.0309 
       *Feedback_Q4    (0.0340)    (0.0397) 
10%<Donation<100%   -0.122   -0.278*** 
       *Feedback_Q2    (0.102)    (0.101) 
10%<Donation<100%  -0.220**    -0.223*** 
       *Feedback_Q3    (0.0950)    (0.0757) 
10%<Donation<100%  -0.224**    -0.213*** 
       *Feedback_Q4    (0.0937)    (0.0749) 
Donation=100%   -0.353***    -0.134** 
       *Feedback_Q2    (0.0970)    (0.0677) 
Donation=100%   -0.403***    -0.204*** 
       *Feedback_Q3    (0.0927)    (0.0678) 
Donation=100%   -0.475***    -0.233*** 
       *Feedback_Q4    (0.0915)    (0.0611) 
Observations 103650  104083  63446  63841 
R-squared 0.021  0.024  0.010  0.011 
Notes:  Standard errors, clustered on seller, are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at p = 0.01, ** for p 
= 0.05, and * for p = 0.10. 
 Table 8: Robustness of feedback results 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent Var.  Sold  log(Max. bid) Sold  log(Max. bid) Sold  log(Max. bid) Sold  log(Max. bid) Sold  log(Max. bid) 
Charity  0.336*** 0.142*** 0.440***  0.157**  0.355*** 0.157*** 0.315*** 0.151***  0.0296  -0.128 
(0.0568) (0.0335) (0.0868) (0.0652) (0.0679) (0.0423) (0.0584) (0.0359)  (0.187)  (0.200) 
log(Feedback)  -0.0343*** -0.0165*** -0.0292*** -0.0132*** -0.0312*** -0.0123*** -0.0330*** -0.0135*** -0.0306*** -0.0100*** 
      *Charity  (0.00761)  (0.00434)  (0.00790)  (0.00413)  (0.00755) (0.00369) (0.00736) (0.00402) (0.00414) (0.00320) 
SKU  0.0218  0.0355*          
      *Charity  (0.0265)  (0.0183)                 
log(Seller  age)     -0.0187  -0.00338        
      *Charity      (0.0125)  (0.00911)             
Category  Conc       -0.0473  -0.0439*      
      *Charity          (0.0355)  (0.0255)         
log(Start  Price)         0.00754  -0.00775*    
      *Charity              (0.00700)  (0.00456)     
Charity  X  State  Dummies?  No No No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations  103650 63446 101030 60802 103650 63446 103650 63446 101961  62436 
R-squared  0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.025 0.012 
Notes:  Standard errors, clustered on seller, are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at p = 0.01, ** for p = 0.05, and * for p = 0.10. 
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Table 9: Impact of charity salience 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Var.  Sold  log(Max. bid) Sold  log(Max. bid)  Sold  log(Max. bid) Sold  log(Max. bid)
Charity 0.0931***  0.0361***  0.0540***  0.0156**      0.1019***  0.0442*** 
(0.0160) (0.0107)  (0.00897)  (0.00774)     (0.0157)  (0.0108) 
Katrina  era  0.0221 -0.00777 0.0255 -0.00318 0.0194 -0.00825     
(0.0236) (0.0250) (0.0238) (0.0264) (0.0236) (0.0255)     
Katrina  era*Charity  0.0973***  0.0392  0.0994***  0.0387      
(0.0279) (0.0265) (0.0271) (0.0283)         
Katrina  charity       0.0331**  0.0207*    
     (0.0134)  (0.0115)    
Non-Katrina  charity       0.110***  0.0404***    
     (0.0186)  (0.0125)    
Katrina  charity       0.161***  0.0568*    
*Katrina  era       (0.0285)  (0.0297)    
Non-Katrina  charity        0.0565  0.0271    
       *Katrina  era          (0.0402)  (0.0326)     
Holidays         0.0125  0.0217 
       (0.0157)  (0.0188) 
Holidays*Charity         -0.0108  -0.0319 
       (0.0233)  (0.0201) 




feedback  Full Full Full Full 
Observations  104083 63841  89054  52483 104083 63841 104083 63841 
R-squared  0.015 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.016 0.008 0.013 0.008 
Notes:  Standard errors, clustered on seller, are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at p = 0.01, ** for p = 0.05, and * for p = 0.10Table A1: Fixed-effects regression of auction listing details on charity 
 
Dependent variable  Constant  GW Indicator 
Reserve price  148.185  -0.564 
 (0.233)  (0.435) 
Shipping fee  6.314  -0.093 
 (0.054)  (0.102) 
Scheduled length  6.176  0.094 
 (0.045)  (0.085) 
Bold listing  0.033  0.002 
 (0.0008)  (0.002) 
Featured 0.016  0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.003) 
Buy-it-now option  -0.337  -0.004 
 (0.004)  (0.008) 
SKU present  0.380  -0.002 
 (0.0007)  (0.001) 
Photo count  1.245  -0.006 
   (0.0033)  (0.005) 
 
Notes:  Each row includes results from a separate regression of an auction detail (e.g. reserve price) on a 
constant, a Giving Works indicator, and fixed effects for each seller-title-subtitle-start price combination.  
The standard errors, which are in parentheses, are clustered by seller.  N = 162,505 with 22,610 groups.  
Each reported estimate in the “Constant” column is significantly different from zero at p < 0.001.  None of 
the reported estimates in the “Giving Works” column is significantly different from zero at p < 0.10. 
  



























10% donation impact on 
   Sale  probability  --  5.85%  11.97%  9.82%  8.08%  0.52% 
   Sale  price  --  2.15%  2.91%  2.64%  2.41%  1.44% 
 
Expected Revenue, Single Sale 
      At median start price  33.63  31.56  32.25  32.02  31.83  30.82 
    93.9% 95.9% 95.2% 94.6%  91.7%
      At mean start price  71.76  67.70  69.36  68.82  68.34  65.01 
    94.3% 96.6% 95.9% 95.2%  91.7%
        
Mean Time to Sell (days)             
      At median start price  23.6  19.7  16.8  17.8  18.5  23.2 
   83.4% 71.2% 75.4% 78.4%  98.3%
      At mean start price  28.2 22.8 19.0 20.2 21.3 27.6 
   80.8% 67.4% 71.6% 75.5%  97.8%
        
 
Notes:  To determine the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentiles, we calculate each seller’s average feedback within a 
SPSE match and sort the 22,610 match-level average feedback values.  These figures are 30, 146, and 526, 
respectively.    The maximum average seller feedback in our sample is 136,297.4.    Median and mean start prices 
for 10% donations are 39.99 and 84.83, respectively.  Calculation assumes an annual cost of capital / discount 
rate of 10%, a daily price decline of .015%, a daily sale probability decline of .005%, and listing and final value 
fees at eBay as of 10/6/2009, including a 10% rebate in listing fees for 10% donations.  We assume no use of 
listing options, such as extra photographs, bold listings, or buy-it-now prices that require extra listing fees. 
Doubling the discount rate, the daily price decline, and the daily sale probability decline (all simultaneously) 
change the calculated present value by less than 1%.  Because a majority of listings in our SPSE sample come 
from high-feedback sellers, the average affect across the sample is smaller than the average effect for a seller with 
the 75





Table A3: Giving Works impact on log(price) when donation is 10% 
 
   (1)  (2) 
Dependent Var.  log(price)  log(price) 
Donation=10% 0.0215**  0.0351 
(0.0103) (0.0280) 
log(Feedback)   -0.00175 
      *  Donation=10%    (0.00371) 
Observations 54416  54177 
R-squared 0.007  0.008 
Notes:  Column (1) represents an identical regression to Table 5, Column (3).  Column 
(2) repeats the regression of Table 7, Column (1) using log(price) as the dependent 
variable.  In both reported regressions above all coefficients except those of interest are 
suppressed.  Standard errors, clustered by seller, are in parentheses.  *** indicates 
significance at p = 0.01, ** for p = 0.05, and * for p = 0.10. 
 
 
 